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Abstract
The principal objective of this paper is to formulate some possible links between
evolutionary economics and regional policy, a topic that has not (yet) been covered by the
literature. We firstly give a brief overview of some issues of regional policy, conceived as a
strategy to influence the spatial matrix of economic development. Then, we outline what
we take to be the essential arguments and components of evolutionary economics. More in
particular, we focus attention on the economic foundation of technology policy from an
evolutionary perspective, and how this deviates from the so-called “equilibrium” rationale.
Then, we examine in what way evolutionary insights may be helpful for regional policy
matters. Our main emphasis is to investigate the degrees fo freedom policy makers may
have to determine the future development of regions.
When evolutionary mechanisms like chance and increasing returns are mainly
involved in the spatial formation of new economic activities, there are several, but quite
contradictory, options for policy makers. On the one hand, the importance of early chance
events implies that multiple potential outcomes of location are quite thinkable. This is a
principal problem for regional policy because new development paths can not be planned
or even foreseen. On the other hand, policy makers may have a role to play here. Since
space exercises only a minor influence on the location of new economic activities, there is
room for policy makers to act and to build-up a favourable local environment. In this
respect, urbanisation economies may offer advantages of flexibility secured by a diversity
of activities which tends to prevent a process of negative lock-in.
When evolutionary mechanisms like selection and path dependency are crucial for
the geography of innovation, policy makers are expected to have more influence on the
spatial pattern of innovation. In such circumstances, new variety is regarded as strongly
embedded in its surrounding environment: the local environment acts as a sort of selection
mechanism because it may, or may not, provide conditions favourable to meet the new
requirements of new technology. Adaptation to change is largely constrained by the
boundaries of the spatial matrix laid down in the past: only minor modifications tend to
take place and do not undermine the logic of the spatial system.2
1. Introduction
Economic theory has developed an increasing number of approaches. Apart from further
developments within the mainstream (the neoclassical school), other directions of research
programs have evolved, e.g. evolutionary economics and institutional economics. In this
paper we will show how evolutionary economics can be used to dealing with spatial issues,
more in particular with that of regional policy. This subject has been chosen because it is a
field which combines issues concerning decision-making with structural change.
Mainstream economics mainly focuses on decision-making within given structures; it
confines the concept of structure to indicate the composition of production and the
configuration of institutional arrangements. The principal effort of this branch of
economics is to show how economic actors deal with changes within the structure, not of
the structure. Evolutionary economics deals with the long-term processes of changing
economic structures, more in particular with the increasing variety of technology and
organization, and with the strategies of economic actors to adapt to changing structures:
strategies to survive. This is exactly one of the major issues of regional policy.
Evolutionary economics emphasizes the continuously growing variety of the
economic structure, continuously creating new technologies, organizations and firms, in
contrast to mainstream economics which deals with one encompassing production function
and with the ‘representative firm’. Differentiation, complexity and uncertainty are key
issues of modern economic theories, mainly based on the input of the Austrian School with
contributions of - in our case - Schumpeter. He also stressed the fundamental impact on the
economic structure by entrepreneurs, which he considered to be the real innovators. This is
the reason why evolutionary economics is sometimes called ‘Neo-Schumpeterian’
economics. It also opens the way to investigate the interrelations between structure and
economic actors as a feedback mechanism. It is not only the given structure which
influences the actors, these actors (specially the 'innovators') also change the structure. An
economic structure is a an environment with many options for the actors; it can be called
the ‘selection environment’ - the structural composition of a society within a framework of
time and space - which influences the actors and is influenced by them. We will not deal
with the 'Impossibility Theorem' of Hayek. According to Hayek, an evolutionary market
order cannot be directed by governments acting with well-defined 'end-states'. Market
outcomes emerge from decentralized decision-making and are, as aggregate results,3
unpredictable and unintended. Hayek is very sceptical on the principle of economic policy.
(Wegner, 1997).
In this paper we first give a brief overview of some issues of regional policy,
conceived as a strategy to influence the ‘spatial matrix of economic development’. Then we
focus on evolutionary economics. Consecutively we formulate evolutionary economics and
regional policy, and formulate some conclusions as to the usefulness of this approach for
regional policy. We contend that those regions which possess certain characteristics more
in particular agglomeration economies and an attractive environment are in general in the
position to attract the innovators (innovators of organization included) and the bearers of
new knowledge (‘the brainworkers’). These regions have better prospects to enjoy
economic prosperity. A policy focusing on improving the physical and social environment
may be one of the important tools to attract these sources of economic growth.
Evolutionary theory shows, however, that there are no certainties where new technologies
will have their main locational impacts.
2. Regional economic problems: theory and policy
In various countries governments are engaged in the process of designing, or
implementing, regional policies, attempting to improve the economic conditions of, mostly,
peripheral and de-industrializing areas. Also on the European level, authorities are
developing various plans to further the economic growth of regions having structural
problems: first, the peripheral areas, often confronted with restructuring their agriculture,
and second, many previously well-developed urbanized manufacturing regions, now having
an unfavourable economic structure. In these ways the European Union is allocating a large
part of its budget (the so-called 'structure funds') to these regions, but it is expected that the
regions themselves also contribute to these efforts.
Many regions - even those with an acceptable level of economic growth- are
developing new strategic plans aiming at keeping up in the 'rat-race' of inter-regional
competition to attract the best investments. This competition may be seen as the result of
an increasing variety of production opportunities in a growing number of regions across the
world. New variety has evolved by the development of new technologies and new
organizational structures. Many regions feel the threat of being outperformed by other4
areas. The regional authorities, the labour unions and other institutions are well aware of
the fact that many economic activities are not locationally fixed any more. Capital is, more
than ever, free to move to other locations. Many regions have dreams of becoming a ’New
Silicon Valley', a ‘Technopolis’, or ‘The Major Gateway', and others have similar highly
speculative goals.
Regional policy presupposes the possibility to intervene in the process of
development of a regional economy and of the inter-regional ‘spatial matrix of economic
development’. Policy means that intervention should lead to a self-defined path of
development, different from that which is being perceived as the current one. Policies are
often focused on short term problems, such as declining unemployment, although quite
often a changing structure can only be influenced over a longer period. The choice of a
theory by politicians can influence the design of the policy. Keynes’s much quoted remark
‘that we will be all dead in the long run’ has had a negative effect on the interest on
structural issues and on the supply side of the economy. His theory was focused on
intervention in the business cycle via the demand side. The perspective of intervention via
the supply side - which is very important for regional policy - is sustained by several
economic theories. In the USA and many other countries the present focus is on
rationalization (mainly by deregulation and a stronger focus on the market mechanism) and
on the supply side, that is, first, strengthening the motivation to seek higher rewards, and,
second, improving the quality of the factors of production, e.g. physical infrastructure and
knowledge. For regional policy this has resulted in abandoning the emphasis of subsidies
for unfavourably developing regions and to shifting attention to the strengthening of
structures, mainly infrastructure. In national economic policy - more in particular in
‘Technology policy’ and ‘Industrial policy’ - a strategy of 'picking the winners' (often the
new sectors with ‘increasing returns’, e.g. electronics and biotechnology) is pursued. The
same is often happening in regional policy, but as is also true for countries, most regions
tend to attract the same ‘winners’ which results in a hefty competition.
The policies pursued can be distinguished in four major approaches:
n  first, those focused on specific industries or technologies because of the pre-supposed
cumulative effects of direct or indirect linkages with other industries and firms or
because of the perception that ‘modern, high-tech’ industries are necessary for economic
growth;5
n  second, those emphasizing the local development or the attraction of high-tech firms,
producer services and highly qualified workers, by policies based on developing an
attractive environment and a perfect physical and social infrastructure;
n  third, a focus on SME’s (small and medium enterprises), on innovating entrepreneurs by
means of the establishment of regional centres (Regional Innovation Centres) to
coordinate, and to foster new ideas and new technologies; the aim is not only to increase
the number of innovators, but also to enhance institution building by SME’s, e.g. by
developing networks; and,
n  fourth, the mainstream approach with its reliance on microeconomic reforms, improving
cost-effectiveness, based on strengthening the market mechanism, which then would
result in the inter-regional clearance of disequilibria. In this paper we pay special
attention to the first three approaches.
Regional policy as a distinct kind of policy developed in the 1930’s in the US (e.g. the
Tenessee Valley Authority) and in the UK (often associated with town and country
planning). The basic idea was that the markets did not produce the neoclassical equilibrium
with inter-regional convergence, so that governments, as part of the New Deal, intervened
with special programmes. One option was to subsidize enterprises located in peripheral
areas; another option was to enhance the basic attractiveness of such regions by heavily
investing in infrastructure, public utilities, and large manufacturing industries with many
linkages, like the steel industry, oil refineries and the automotive industry.
Many approaches were being used in regional policy. One of the earlier and very
influential theories is the so-called ’growth-pole theory’ (Lambooy, 1969), based on the
ideas of the French economist Perroux (1955). This theory focused on the idea that
economic development occurs via the expansion of networks of connected firms, wherever
their location ('espace economique' as Perroux called it), with ‘nodes’, or ‘growth poles’,
the focal points in the networks consisting of the principal firms, the driving forces of
economic growth. These economic relations were not only dependent on location, but more
decisively so on the nature of market relations in economic space, not in geographical
space. Nevertheless, governments could decide to invest in heavy industry, considered as
‘growth poles’, in peripheral locations, which then could develop their own networks of
related firms, by outsourcing and subcontracting. In that case, part of the multiplier effects6
of these investments were expected to develop in those regions and consecutively should
start a cumulative regional development process.
A related approach can also be found in the theory of Gunnar Myrdal (1957). In
contrast to the neoclassical theory of inter-regional convergence via the market mechanism,
he used the idea of ’cumulative development’, a process in which a virtuous cycle of
investment and increased attraction created spatial disparities of regions. Metropolitan
regions, or other regions with an initial advantage, would develop even more; while
peripheral regions, even with low wages, would decline, not grow. The theoretical ‘end-
product’ of neoclassical theory should be equilibrium and convergence towards equalised
wage- and profit levels, not increased differences in growth, such as Myrdal's approach
would predict.
The theoretical base to start from is very important when regional authorities decide
upon devising and implementing a regional policy. They have to consider the many
uncertainties of economic, institutional and technological developments and the history of
the region. In evolutionary economics various concepts have been developed which can be
used to understand how regional economic structures evolve and change. It has a specific
interest in historical paths of development and in changing structures (Boschma &
Lambooy, forthcoming).
Regional policy cannot start from scratch, it has to accept history (path dependence)
and the stochastic results of (previous) developments (Lambooy, 1986; Boschma, 1994).
However, governments and other regional institutions are not only dependent on history or
on markets. Their degrees of freedom to act are related to the argument that the specific
local, regional and national patterns of institutions and national technology systems may
offer opportunities for urban and regional authorities to influence the direction of the
development paths of the technological and organisational processes.
In this paper we investigate the degrees of freedom regions (an indication of a mix
of actors: authorities, entrepreneurs, labour unions, etc.) possess to determine their own
future. Although it is virtually impossible for politicians (and economists as well) to pick
the winners; for certain regions it may seem possible to attract producer services and firms
with already acknowledged new technologies. Anyway it seems to be important to attract
people who are the decisive workers in the new economy: the 'brainworkers', more in
particular in the 'knowledge-intensive services'. Not all regions possess the opportunities to
attract the new sources of economic growth. In regional economics characteristics such as7
agglomeration economies and the differentiation of economic activities (Jacobs, 1968) are
assumed to be important to develop or to attract new strong economic activities
3. Some aspects of evolutionary economics
We begin by outlining what we take to be the essential arguments and components of
evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi et al. 1988). We focus on how new
activities and organizational and institutional structures lead to new and more variety in
economic activities, or increasing complexity. More complexity and new variety (the
development of new ’species’ of technologies and economic activities) is seen as a
fundamental attribute of development. In a certain sense economic growth may be conceived
as reflecting the increasing complexity associated with the evolution of new variety and with
the changing environment. New variety and increasing complexity will be the result of new
technologies, new products, new locations, new organizations and new institutions.
According to evolutionary economics, this new variety may be affected by the environment,
but not in a predictable way. Variety in behaviour and in structures is a key assumption for
evolutionary economics. Here we claim that, even when stochastic events occur, key concepts
in evolutionary thinking, such as variety, uncertainty, routines, path dependency, bounded
rationality and selection, suggest that new variety is strongly embedded in its surrounding
environment, and that various, although often unpredictable, kinds of reaction can occur.
These concepts were used by Nelson and Winter (1982), following Simon (1956);
they replaced the neoclassical notions of rational, optimal (maximizing) behaviour in favor of
a more satisfactory, realistic concept of satisficing behaviour in uncertain situations without
perfect information. This latter notion accounts for the fact that the decision-making process
often takes place within the boundaries of existing routines. Uncertainty and bounded
rationality are, probably, the most important behavioural assumptions of the evolutionary
theory; they have major implications for the particular nature of decision-making and for the
problem of adjustment. Economic agents are confronted with a high rate of uncertainty
because the production environment in which they operate is complex and unstable, while the
information on which they base their decision-making is far from freely available. This is also
true for locational developments (Webber, 1972). It is, sometimes rational from the point of
view of the firm to ignore promising (even superior) alternatives which deviate from their8
existing routines because high adjustment costs as well as high risks and uncertainty are
involved: the boundaries of existing trajectories act as constraints on the ability of economic
agents to react to changing market signals or to changing technologies.
Firms will not adopt or implement new technology, or adapt to a changing
environment as smoothly as is assumed by the conventional neoclassical model. It is because
of evading uncertainty that firms or organizations tend to undertake routinized, more or less
predictable behaviour. The common attitude of producers and consumers is to form habits
and conventions, and they do that more often than consciously maximizing profits or utility
functions. Habits and conventions are developed within regional contexts of social networks
of ‘embedded’ participants. According to Storper (1997) this is one reason why innovation of
technology and institutions are often a regional phenomenon. Searches for new technology
are likely to be undertaken locally, that is, directed to technologies and markets with which
firms have become familiar in the past (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Heiner, 1983). In other
words, history matters in evolutionary thinking. History in terms of the inheritance of
(regional) structures, institutions and ideas often acts as a filter for assessing new
opportunities. New developments, even within the very region in which these happen, are not
always being perceived as a new way of organizing or producing. People (such as politicians
and economists) notice much later that there have been fundamental changes.
Dosi (1982) has proposed the notion of technological trajectory to stress the
importance of investigating longer periods of development, when describing the peculiar,
evolutionary nature of innovative behaviour of organizations. Innovative behaviour is
considered to proceed along rather narrowly defined paths which guide the exploratory
activities of firms. This path dependency is related to the accumulation of knowledge,
information and experience (learning processes). This is quite relevant for assessing the
dimensions of the processes of adjustment to the increasing complexity, which is associated
with evolving technologies.
Evolutionary economics (or Neo-Schumpeterian economics), the approach we will
follow in this paper, focuses primarily on structural, long term developments, and as such it
emphasizes more specifically the 'structural' parameters of development -such as the
composition of industries, technological and organizational factors (Boschma, 1997).
However, evolutionary economics also focuses on the dynamic relation of economic actors
and their (‘selection’) environment because development can be conceived as being the
result of the dynamic interaction between actors and the selection environment (Boschma9
& Lambooy, 1998). The increasing variety of economic activities leads to more
complexity. In economic development the selection of the ‘best’, ‘the strongest’, or ‘the
fittest’ is a process which differs from biology, because of human actions.
Hence, evolutionary economics has two faces. The first one focuses on the longer
term growth-paths, or trajectories, and the second one has an emphasis on human strategies
in the struggle to survive, sometimes in adverse environments. This latter one emphasizes
the ways to improving the properties of the structure, or the conditions of production, in
order to raise the productivity of the actors, by influencing the selection environment by
well devised strategies of innovation. In general, evolutionary economics does not consider
individual decision-making as such. Schumpeter, however, argued that individual
entrepreneurs were able to enjoy extra benefits by using innovation strategies. But he did
not investigate individuals as such, but instead he focused on the entrepreneurs as a general
category of people, who are willing to take risks in a context of economic uncertainty.
Later he accepted the role of large corporations and governments in the process of
innovation (Schumpeter, 1943).
We contend that actors, such as entrepreneurs and politicians, do have a certain
influence on the path of development, once a particular path has started to evolve. The
deliberate creation of a new development path is almost impossible, because it is the result
of, first, surprising, unexpected discoveries or not consciously made decisions, and second,
many unrelated decisions, divided by time and space. In these circumstances, it is very
difficult to plan a new path of (technological or organizational) development. In our
perspective we emphasize the principle of a plurality of development paths. Evolutionary
economics argues that selection environments and agents are interacting in an mutually
adaptive process with uncertain outcomes. As chaos theory would predict, the development
process can not be investigated as a linear process. Small changes in the variables can
result in large deviations from the expected outcomes of a planning process (Kemp, 1997).
The principal objective of this paper is to formulate some possible links between
evolutionary economics and regional policy, a topic that has not (yet) been covered by the
literature. Whereas evolutionary economics is often believed to be at its initial stage of
development (Nelson, 1995), this certainly applies to the analysis of policy implications of
evolutionary thinking. We briefly discuss the contrasting perspectives provided by the
“equilibrium” and “evolutionary” approach with respect to the theoretical foundation of
technology policy. By doing so, we draw heavily on the work of Metcalfe (1994; 1995).10
The so-called “equilibrium” theory of policy is well-developed in the literature. It
focuses attention on the notion of “market failures” which underpin the rationale for
technology policy. In short, market incentives will not produce a Pareto-optimal allocation
of resources to innovation. This is attributed to the problem of assymetric information
(imperfect distribution of information across economic agents), externalities, and
monopolistic powers. Moreover, it is assumed that the policy maker is fully informed and
is capable of identifying and implementing optima.
The evolutionary approach focuses attention on the extent to which the selection
mechanism generates socially acceptable outcomes, and how problems of adjusting to
change can be minimized. This view differs from the equilibrium approach because market
power and information assymetries are regarded as anything but problems. On the contrary,
these are the necessary conditions for technological change to occur in a technologically
progressive world, because they provide the sources of profit opportunity. Technology
policy has two main purposes in an evolutionary world. The first is to ensure the creativity
of the economic system and the diversity of behaviour by stimulating the technological and
innovative capabilities of the economic system. This may be achieved through the
openness of competition and appropriability, which lower the barriers to innovative entry.
Moreover, according to Metcalfe (1994), “the effective operation of an evolutionary
innovation system depends on the effective coupling between firms and other knowledge-
based institutions to jointly enhance the process of learning and creativity” (p. 497). The
second purpose of technology policy is to ensure the efficient selection of market and non-
market environments. For example, this may be guaranteed by an efficient capital market.
According to Metcalfe (1994), the role of the policy maker is completely different in an
evolutionary world: “the evolutionary policy maker adapts rather than optimizes” (p. 418).
In a world of uncertainty, policy makers pursue a policy of trial-and-error. They learn and
adopt in the light of experience, and there is no guarantee of success.
.
4. Selection and path dependency in space
We stated elsewhere that evolutionary notions like path dependency, increasing returns,
chance and selection can be useful concepts in the geography of innovation (Boschma and
Lambooy 1998; forthcoming). Many economic geographers suggest that regions matter in11
innovation, despite the fact that it remains difficult to assess the particular impact of the local
environment on the innovative behaviour or capabilities of persons and firms. The concept of
agglomeration economies, which basically deals with the advantages of geographical
proximity, implicitly encompasses evolutionary notions like path dependency and learning
processes. We now examine in what way evolutionary insights may be helpful for regional
policy matters. Our main emphasis is to investigate the degrees of freedom policy makers
may have to determine the future development of regions. In this Section, we discuss the
options for policy makers when evolutionary mechanisms of selection and path dependency
determine to a large extent the geography of innovation. In Section 5, we deal with this issue
in case the evolutionary mechanisms of chance and increasing returns lay at the root of the
spatial formation of new economic activities.
Though stochastic events take place, randomness is often constrained by Darwinian
selection. The selection mechanism guides and constraints creative and adaptive behaviour
and, therefore, determines to a large extent which innovations thrive or fail. New variety
which does not fit into the production environment is bound to disappear. In other words, the
local environment acts as a sort of selection mechanism that may, or may not, provides
conditions favourable to meet the new requirements of change. According to Nelson (1995),
this is exactly what the essence of evolutionary theory is all about, that is, to provide an
explanatory framework for ‘... mechanisms that systematically winnow on extant variation’
(p. 56). In evolutionary thinking, the selection environment consists of markets and a set of
non-market factors. These latter include technological principles or opportunities, institutions
and ‘socially held and enforced values, norms, beliefs, customs, and generally accepted
practices’ (Dosi and Nelson 1994, p. 159). Storper (1997) states that the development of
habits, conventions and tacit knowledge in certain regions are enabling factors for the
location of new economic growth.
Following this line of thought, we may identify a set of structural parameters that
determine the suitability of a region for the start and further development of new economic
activities (Boschma and Lambooy, 1998). Agglomeration advantages only result when such a
set of structural parameters exists in a certain region. With structural parameters we denote
factors like the composition of the current production structure (including the importance of
sectors characterized by increasing returns), the number of workers and their knowledge
level, the size of demand for certain goods and services, the efficiency of market institutions
(such as financial organizations, business clubs), and an efficient system of fiscal and non-12
fiscal regulations by the government. This implies that the capacity of regions to adjust is
likely to differ. Regions, defined as socio-economic entities, not only differ in their ability to
generate, emulate or apply new technology, they also differ in their adaptive capacity (Jacobs,
1968). This may be the case because local actors, embedded in a regional culture, form
individual or collective strategies (even on a local level, formalized in local institutions) in
order to influence the course of development in their regions. Others have stressed the
process of localized technological learning (Feldman and Florida, 1994): knowledge
spillovers are facilitated by geographical proximity and, therefore, are often region-specific.
In other words, much new variety is largely directed and channeled by the existing
environment. Uncertainty provokes firms to conduct routinized behaviour which limits to a
large extent available options, while the selection environment (the institutional and
economic structures) guides, enables and constraints its local actors to retain and expand their
competitive position.
This may be related to the notion of path dependency: innovative behaviour and
adaptation to change are largely constrained by the boundaries of the spatial matrix laid down
in the past. Only minor modifications tend to take place, and do not undermine the logic of
the spatial system. In traditional location theory the main source of this spatial polarization
are external economies of scale (Weberian localization economies) in a limited spatial area,
due to the clustering of similar, strongly related, groups of economic activity. This view is
based on a static approach of external economies. A more dynamic approach uses the concept
of cumulative causation. Since Myrdal (1957), cumulative causation has been the key notion
to describe the persistence of centre-periphery relations, particularly in development
economics (Dicken and Lloyd, 1990; Krugman, 1995). Though the adaptive ability of some
lagging regions may improve as new technologies mature and standardize due to specific
cost-advantages (low labour costs), this catching-up process is utmost based on static
locational advantages, which is unlikely to erode the dynamic position of the original region
(Storper, 1992). Regional policy (and national economic policy as well) sometimes faces the
dilemma to have to choose between ’the devil and the deep blue sea’: either to be independent
from foreign headquarters and have unemployment, or to attract branch plants, which can
easily be ’transplanted’ again to other tax-friendly locations.
This brings us to the question what the options are for policy makers to determine the
future development of regions in a spatial system in which selection and path dependency are
important mechanisms. In regional policy the intervention is oriented to altering the13
configuration of the structural parameters. The impact of regional policy may be quite large
when it is strongly embedded in the surrounding environment. Adjusting of acquired
characteristics, which is achieved by learning, is essential because it determines to a large
extent available options and probable outcomes of policy. But how do regional authorities
’scan’ ’new’ technologies: how can these be evaluated as to their fitness to being used as
driving forces for their region’s restructuring? They are often more directly influenced by the
representatives of their ’old’ technologies, which is the reason why ’old’ corporations and
labour unions often oppose new developments: they are ’locked-in’ by their interests and their
’old’ knowledge (Grabher, 1993). This remains a problem to be solved. However, regional
policy is likely to fail when local strategies deviate considerably from the local context.
Policy makers have to account for the fact that adaptation to change is largely constrained by
the boundaries of the spatial matrix carried over from the past: only minor modifications may
take place.
5.  Accidents, human agency and agglomeration economies
Besides the emphasis on selection and path dependency, the evolution of the spatial matrix of
economic development may also be associated with the occurrence of chance events and
increasing returns. We now discuss the degrees of freedom regional policy makers may have
in case the evolutionary mechanisms of chance and increasing returns lay at the root of the
spatial formation of new economic activities.
Nelson and Winter (1982) argue that new technology or new routines may be quite
unexpected, stochastic results of search activities undertaken by firms. According to Arthur
(1989), as chaos theory would predict, small, arbitrary triggers, which are hard to know
beforehand, let alone predict, may set in motion mutations of structures, and thus should be
conceived as pure accidents. In this view, the selection mechanism is of minor importance,
especially when new basic variety in terms of technological breakthroughs is involved:
selection will be weak because there are no specific stimuli (besides general factors) to
benefit from (Boschma and Van der Knaap, 1997). Accordingly, the selection environment
can not decisively determine the location of new variety because of its discontinuous nature.
Therefore, other mechanisms are necessarily involved, like accidents and local strategies of
adjustment. The importance of randomness rather than selection has many equivalents in14
many fields of economic research, such as why one type of industrial organization (mass-
production) became dominant over others (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Chandler, 1990), why a
particular technology became more diffused than other competing ones (David, 1985; Arthur,
1989), and why a country was able to industrialize earlier than another country (Crafts, 1977).
In economic geography, we are preoccupied with a similar problem: why the (quite
accidental) early phase of development of a new industry evolves into a self-reinforcing
process of growth and development in one or a few regions, and not in other (similar)
locations (see e.g. Scott and Storper, 1987). The relevance of this problem may be shown in
several examples in economic history (Boschma, 1994). The importance of early chance
events implies that multiple potential outcomes of locations are quite thinkable, that is, other
arbitrary events might have caused history and spatial patterns to take another course. The
outcome is then unpredictable ex ante, while the winner does not necessarily possess superior
qualities.
This sheds particular light on the problem of why some regions lose their position
where others maintain or regain a strong position. Although the concept of adjustment to the
environment is a basic one, evolutionary economics is not as such a contextual approach. In
fact, we need the notion of human agency to explain the spatial patterns of new variety of
economic actors, products, technologies and organizations which can be linked to the
dynamic dimension of agglomeration economies. In fact, there may be new forms of variety
(major technological breakthroughs) which may be influenced by local selection mechanisms,
but are often quite ’location-free’ in its further development: they shape their local
environment in accordance to their needs as their development proceeds. Thus, the selection
environment is anything but treated as given, and allows firms and related institutions (such
as regional authorities) ‘to mould their own selection environment’ (see Nelson, 1995, p. 77).
The fortunes of regions may depend to a large extent on their own ability to create locally or
attract their necessary conditions of growth (Storper and Walker, 1989). In this respect, firms
and other organizations are not viewed as merely passive actors in a Darwinian sense: they
are regarded as actors in a Lamarckian meaning who display purposeful and learning
behaviour, adapt their behaviour to the external environment, but also adapt their
environment in accordance with their own needs (Saviotti, 1996). If this would not occur,
new variation which strongly deviates from the surrounding environment would not arise,
and should be completely ruled out. The efficiency of the structural parameters based on
urbanization economies will only emerge after a period of development of the new15
technology, after the surrounding environment has been adjusted in accordance to the needs
of the new technology and of the new kinds of knowledge-intensive workers in
manufacturing and the services. This not only results in local accumulation of (tacit)
knowledge, which is partly inappropriable, that is hard to copy or emulate by competitors, but
it also leads to increasing variation, resulting in increasing returns, not only for individual
firms or sectors, but also for other parts of the complementary, associated networks.
The basic characteristic of increasing returns and cumulative causation is mainly
found in new, rapidly developing, technologies. Arthur (1994; 1996) argues that an important
feature of industries is whether they possess increasing returns. Industries with this attribute
are highly dynamic and knowledge-intensive sectors with many unexpected developments,
e.g. the micro-electronic sectors. Other peculiar properties of increasing returns are: ‘...
market instability (the market tilts to favor a product that gets ahead), multiple potential
outcomes (under different events in history, different operating systems (of the software-
industry) could have won), unpredictability, the ability to 'lock-in' a market, the possible
predominance of an inferior product, and fat profits for the winners’ (Arthur, 1996, p.102).
This stands in contrast with industries which are characterized by diminishing returns, such as
bulk-processing activities, where the operations are largely repetitive day to day or week to
week. This latter part of the economy resembles most to the neoclassical perfect competition:
‘..because such products are normally substitutable for one another, something like a standard
price emerges. Margins are thin and nobody makes a fat profit’ (p. 102). I-sectors are not yet
well perceived and documented, and markets as well as governments are not yet well aware
of their significance. Imitators will, however, soon arrive and enter the market. But during the
first period, the characteristic of cumulative and feedback developments may strongly limit
the possibilities of  neoclassical optimal allocation - if we would ever be able to know what
that is. In sum, a basic property of economic activities is increasing returns, a concept related
to the advantages accruing from innovations, increasing variety and differentiation of
economic activities
As far as geography is concerned, the concept of increasing returns becomes relevant
when it is related with notions, such as Myrdal's 'cumulative causation', ‘external economies’
and ‘network relations’, complementary relations between producers, their suppliers and their
distribution systems (Arthur, 1989). Spatial clustering can bring about increasing returns in a
rather limited area (Lambooy, 1986). The notion of agglomeration economies plays a crucial
role in the explanation of how this spatial configuration comes about (Lambooy, 1976;16
Harrison et al. 1996). Agglomeration economies can be defined as the advantages that accrue
to firms which have a better access to resources (production factors and power) than would be
the case when they were located elsewhere. This is the result of historical events and
economies of scale and scope, a topic already noticed by Marshall in his famous book of
1890 Principles of Economics. Local external economies may be associated with market-size
external economies (deep division of labour, specialisation) and information or technological
spillovers (experience, learning and knowledge diffusion) concentrated in a particular area
(Krugman, 1995). With respect to the latter, Pred (1966) claims that regions that are the
centres of communication and interaction networks have the highest probability of obtaining
access to relevant information and thus the best chance to adapt, because these networks ‘...
provide ideas, conceptual stimuli, observations, and other bits of information that are less
available under conditions of relative geographic isolation ...’ (p. 99). Schamp (1996),
however, notes that more understanding is required as to whether learning processes are
indeed often embedded in such a narrowly-defined regional context, and which type of
agglomeration mechanism, besides selection - which may be held responsible for why only
one or two regions become dominant - may be related to the notion of increasing returns. It is
not always necessary that selection is involved in the selection of regions which become
successful innovators. In the words of Nelson (1995), ‘... for some chance reason, it gained an
initial lead, and this started a rolling mechanism’ (p. 74). This latter combination of chance
and increasing returns implies that there may be a multiplicity of spatial outcomes of long
term economic development of regions. Sub-optimal outcomes are possible, that is, the
dominant region may not necessarily possess superior qualities, because non-optimal
locations may become ‘locked in’ through increasing returns (Martin and Sunley, 1996).
Nevertheless, having said this, certain environments may be more favourable for the
development of new technologies and economic processes, and certainly for the bearers of
new developments in the i-sectors, the 'brainworkers'. These regions possess factors of a basic
(non-specific) nature (such as basic knowledge and skills, which are generally accessible),
which may be rather favourable to generate new technology, but are not beforehand
geographically determined. We specify more in detail in what way the surrounding
environment may exercise influence on the location of new variety, and how this may be
combined with accidental and creative events by human agency. The notion of urbanization
economies may be relevant here. The notion of urbanization economies is related to local
externalities associated with the proximity of actors (and more in particular the people with17
specific knowledge) from many diverse industries, which is typical for so-called diversified
regions with products and services in almost all sectors. In fact, urbanization economies may
be based and built on general factors because of the advantages of flexibility secured by a
diversity of activities which tends to prevent a process of negative lock-in. It is especially the
highly diversified type of regions, such as the Parisian region and the London region, that
seems to possess potential or well-developed competences (’knowledge’), based on
urbanization economies, to develop new ideas, organizations, and technologies again and
again and to keep up with new regions that base their fortune on a specific kind of new
technologies only (Castells and Hall, 1994). This type of region seems to possess in particular
the  i-characteristics and are ’service-rich’; therefore they have the competences to using
general factors (especially k and e) to transform them into specific ones (specialized k and e),
from which new technology may take further advantage. In fact, these factors are susceptible
to human learning and to strategic behaviour of entrepreneurs, organizations and
governments. Thus, it is especially the type of regions that are highly diversified (with
agglomeration economies) that seems to possess such a potential or well-developed ability to
develop new technologies again and again. Selection is even more likely to occur when
specific factors hamper the process of adjustment, as has been the case in many traditional
industrial regions.
In sum, spatial accidents and human agency have a considerable impact on the place
where new basic variety emerges. Selection by the environment alone hardly determines the
success or failure of regions to generate or develop major new technologies. When
evolutionary mechanisms like chance and increasing returns are mainly involved in the
spatial formation of new economic activities, there are several, but quite contradictory,
options for policy makers. On the one hand, the importance of early chance events implies
that multiple potential outcomes of location are quite thinkable. This is a principal problem
for regional policy because new development paths can not be planned or even foreseen.
Regional policy may be defined as a type of purported spatial change, in which a region
attempts to match the requirements of new technologies and new location processes.
However, policy makers have to cope with a key problem here: how to define selection, and
how to specify fitness.
On the other hand, policy makers may have a considerable role to play. Since space
exercises only a minor influence on the location of new economic activities, there is room for
policy makers to act and to build-up a favourable local environment. Given this scope for18
human action, we specify and define what are the possibilities (or degrees of freedom) for
regions to develop successful strategies in order to stimulate variety in regions. In this respect,
urbanization economies may offer advantages of flexibility secured by a diversity of activities
which tends to prevent a process of negative lock-in. However, it leaves unanswered the
question to what extent local strategies may be successful that do not account for existing
economic, environmental and institutional structures. Can local strategies ever be successful
that deviate from the existing production structure, and that are directed to change
fundamentally the course of regional development? We contend (Lambooy, 1986; 1996;
Boschma, 1994) that even with optimal strategies there is no guarantee for being the region in
which the next technology will be located. In many cases new technologies developed first in
new, unexpected locations, not in the main regions where the previous technologies
developed. Those regions, however, with a good parametrical structure can often catch up.
So, even now, one can notice that the Paris region or the region in North Italy have well-
developed i-sectors with new technologies. Other regions like Walloon and the Ruhr region
with a lock-in of old technologies display the troubles which can arise if a region cannot
adjust rapidly enough to new conditions. The internal structure of the Ruhr region, however,
seems to be better equipped with adjustment potential than Walloon, because of its greater
internal variation and also because of the stronger resistance of old structures in Wallon,
which seems to be more ‘locked-in’ than the Ruhr area.
We contend that organizational and local strategies which are aimed at changing the
existing production structure and directed to alter fundamentally the course of regional
development, have to be based on the development or the attraction of knowledge workers
and the so-called i-activities (Arthur, 1996); these regions tend to be characterized by an
increasing complexity of the composition of the local economic structure. However, it is
unpredictable whether innovative industries based on new technologies will follow the old
locational patterns or whether they will by their own force create new structures. New
markets often display types of production with increasing returns, the i-activities. This means
that the entrepreneurs are less susceptible to old sectoral and locational patterns. Their style of
management and production as well as their location choices may be different (Arthur, 1996).
It is not only the entrepreneur who decides upon the locational structure, it is also the scarce
knowledge worker, who is an essential asset to the firm, more in particular in the earlier
knowledge-intensive stages of development, but even in those cases where the share in the19
market depends strongly on the continuous efforts of R&D, such as in the pharmaceutical
and design-intensive industries (Garnsworthy and O’Connor, 1997).
In considering the options for regional policy, it seems also essential that enterprises
in the i-sectors are developing relatively fast. So the barriers to entry should be low,
especially the costs of producing or acquiring knowledge, and the availability of flexible
regulations and access to credit seem to be decisive for success. It should be possible to foster
the region’s learning processes, not only by enhancing training and education, but also to
assist SME’s to innovate and establish networks of cooperation; also it is possible to create an
environment which retains or attracts the innovators and the workers which are decisive for
the development of competences. Attractive physical environments, the availability of a
diversified structure of educational and medical facilities, and the inter-regional means of
transport and communication can be considered as very important in the first place, and
which can be influenced by the regional community in the second place. The comparison of
the examples of the Boston region and the Silicon Valley by Saxenian (1994) shows that the
managerial lock-in of the computer sector (with its corporate rigidities) prevented the Boston
region to successfully adapt to the new opportunities of the transistor and the rapid
developments of new software and the PC, although the attractive environment and the
diversified knowledge base provided plenty of new opportunities for the Boston-region.
However, the large computer industries did organize themselves in a rigid way, without
sufficiently noticing the fundamental changes which were evolving in the Silicon area and
other West Coast regions. Various large companies, like Wang, met with serious difficulties.
Looking back at the sixties and seventies, the rise of Silicon Valley (and of California in
general) is not a strange phenomenon. Its development trajectory already started to evolve
decades before with the results of human agency, the establishment of Stanford University
and its developing social network of brainworkers (what we would like to call the human
ecology of technological nerds) and with a strong impetus from defence projects. It was not a
deterministic process, but a process with a large, though unconscious, influence of human
agents, developing increasing returns in the new i-sector.
There are many different ways the strategies of adjustment can be organized (internal,
external). Regions and regional actors should put effort to create the conditions which
facilitate the development and growth of this type of activities. This may be realized by
upgrading the surrounding environment where necessary, that is strengthening the weak
elements in the local context. Given the scope for human agency, there may be possibilities20
for regional actors to influence their destiny to some extent with well-chosen strategies. Some
regions have internal and external selection-mechanisms of innovation and survival that
ensure their relative success. Regions which choose a path with a strategy of saving old
sectors and cost-reduction instead of aiming for innovation and diversification will compete
with other core regions in the less profitable sectors, with few positive effects on the
development of new knowledge and the development of sectors based on increasing returns.
There are two selection mechanisms for the regions involved: one is focused on the
internal selection of successful restructuring of the economic attractiveness, the second one is
related with the selection of successful strategies compared with competing regional systems.
In the first case the entrepreneurs and the institutions are engaged in finding solutions for
internal problems such as wages rates and taxes, or improving the access to the region or to
sub-regions, e.g. by improving the infrastructure. In the second one, the search is for
developing measures for attracting ‘foreign direct investments’ or knowledge-intensive
activities: the related investments can be Science Parks, a high regional R&D-effort and the
improvement of the physical and residential environment.
6. Conclusion
The principal objective of this paper was to formulate some possible links between
evolutionary economics and regional policy, a topic that has not (yet) been covered by the
literature. In other words, the paper made an attempt to explore whether evolutionary
economics provides a new way to understand the role of regional policy. Our main emphasis
has been to investigate the degrees of freedom policy makers may have to determine the
future development of regions. This has been done by distinguishing between two ideal-types
of regional development based on evolutionary principles.
We concluded that the options for policy makers to determine the future development
of regions may be regarded as rather limited in a spatial system in which selection and path
dependency are important mechanisms. Though the impact of regional policy may be quite
large when it is strongly embedded in the surrounding environment, regional policy is likely
to fail when local strategies deviate considerably from the local context. In this context,
policy makers have to account for the fact that adaptation to change is largely constrained by
the boundaries of the spatial matrix carried over from the past.21
When  chance and increasing returns have a considerable impact on the spatial
formation of new economic activities, it is impossible to predict the new spatial matrix of the
economic system. Selection by the environment alone hardly determines the success or failure
of regions to generate or develop major new technologies. In this context, there are several,
but quite contradictory, options for policy makers in order to stimulate variety in regions. On
the one hand, regional policy have to cope with the fact that new development paths can not
be planned or even foreseen. On the other hand, policy makers may have a considerable role
to play: there is room for policy makers to act and to build-up a favourable local environment.
This is especially true for regions where urbanization economies offer advantages of
flexibility secured by a diversity of activities which tends to prevent a process of negative
lock-in. Many regions possess the opportunities to improve their local environments in order
to attract the knowledge workers which can develop new ideas and new economic activities,
probably comprising some which can be the nucleus for new developments.
In either case, evolutionary theory shows that there is no certainty about where new
technologies will have their main locational impacts. Selection environments and agents are
interacting in a mutually adaptive process with uncertain outcomes. Nevertheless, local
strategies that are directed to change fundamentally the course of regional development are
unlikely to be succesful when these deviate from the existing local structures.
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